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Abstract—Supported by the emerging technologies of Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) and network slicing, 5G networks
allow tenants to rent resources from mobile network operators
(MNOs) in order to provide services without possessing an own
network infrastructure. The MNOs are therefore facing the
problem of deciding if to accept or decline the resource renting
requests they receive. This paper builds a stochastic model that
describes the MNO’s revenue and opportunity cost of accepting
a contract, and therewith proposes a strategy that is analytically
derived to maximize the expected profit at every decision.
Index Terms—Network slicing, multi-tenant network, profit
model, network resource management, 5G network optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
N
ETWORK slicing was proposed by the Next Generation
Mobile Networks (NGMN) Alliance [1], since then it has
become one of the hottest topics in the filed of future 5th
Generation (5G) mobile communication networks. Generally,
the concept of network slicing can be understood as creating
and maintaining multiple independent logical networks (slices)
on a common physical infrastructure, each slice operates a sep-
arate business service. Enabled and supported by the emerging
technologies of software defined networks (SDN) and network
function virtualization (NFV), network slicing exhibits great
potentials, not only in supporting specialized applications with
extreme performance requirements, but also in benefiting the
mobile network operators (MNOs) with increased revenue [2].
As pointed out by Rost et al. [2], a sliced mobile network
manages its infrastructure and virtual resources in independent
scalable slices, each slice runs a homogeneous service with
simple business model. Thus, an MNO can dynamically and
flexibly create, terminate and scale its slices to optimize the
resource utilization for a better revenue or profit.
In a previous paper [3], we have proposed a profit opti-
mization model for sliced mobile networks that run in the
traditional business mode: the MNOs with network resources
implement the slices and provide all network services directly
to their end-users. In this case, an MNO has full a priori
knowledge about the service demand and the cost/revenue
models of its every slice. It is able to scale the slices according
to their profiting efficiencies, in order to achieve the maximal
overall profit under the resource constraint. This is a classic
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multi-objective optimization problem (MOOP), in which the
main challenge is to solve the optimum, or at least to find a
satisfactory solution, with an affordable computing effort.
Unfortunately, this model does not apply to the slices run by
tenants such as mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs),
which are considered to play an important role in 5G networks
[4]. Tenants are third-parties that provide services without
owning any network infrastructure, e.g. utility/automotive
companies and over-the-top service providers such as YouTube.
To implement services, they have to be granted by MNOs with
network resources, including radio / infrastructure resources
and virtualized resource blocks. In legacy networks, every
tenant makes its contractual agreement with the MNO(s), to
pay a fixed and coarsely estimated annual/monthly fee for
these resource sharing concepts. In the context of network
slicing, in contrast, the resources are first bundled into slices
before granted to tenants upon demand. Depending on the
type, size and lifetime of granted slice, the fee is specified.
This approach improves the sharing efficiency and the resource
utilization rate. However, as such slices are maintained by
tenants, the MNO has neither insight into their efficiencies
of making revenue at end-users, nor authentication to rescale
or terminate them during their lifetime. Instead, the MNO
formulates the fee rate for different resource bundles, and
chooses if to accept or decline the slice requests from tenants,
like discussed in [5]. In this case, the MNO cannot jointly
optimize all slices in a fully dynamic approach, but only
attempt to make the best decision for every received request,
which is a problem of decision theory and operations research.
In this paper, we will focus on the case of tenant slices,
and propose an economic model that evaluates the profit of
an MNO to accept a certain slice request from tenant. Based
on this model we propose a decision strategy to maximize
the expected overall network profit at every decision step.
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II
we simplify the problem described above to an approximate
business model. Then we build the profit model in Sec. III,
starting with an ideal simple case and then approach to the
complex reality step-by-step, on every step we deduce a profit-
maximizing decision strategy from the proposed profit model.
At the end we close the paper with our conclusion and outlooks
in Sec. V.
II. SIMPLIFIED BUSINESS PROBLEM
A. Fundamental Assumptions
Our study begins with some basic assumptions and approx-
imations on the business case. First of all, in most countries
2and regions, the mobile network infrastructure is controlled by
only a few or even one single MNO, i.e. the network resource
market is never perfectly competitive but highly oligarchy or
monopoly. Hence, in this work we consider the case with only
one MNO, ignoring the competition between different MNOs.
Second, the MNO holds a resource pool, which contains
resources of certain types. Self-evidently, resource of every
type is limited in amount. To rent these resources to tenants,
a list of available contracts is provided by the MNO, every
contract defined by a resource bundle, a contract period and a
periodical payment. Every resource bundle is specified for a
reference slice of certain type and size. We assume that the list
of available contracts are predefined and remains consistent.
When a tenant requires resources to implement a slice, it
selects one from the available contracts, requests to possess
the corresponding resource bundle for the contract period.
The MNO then decides if to accept or decline the request.
Upon acceptance, the contract is confirmed and the tenant
periodically pays the quota defined in the contract. If denied,
the requested resource bundle will not be dedicated, and can be
flexibly exploited for the MNO’s own slices to make revenue.
We consider that a confirmed contract cannot be terminated
or modified within its period. We neglect the priority of
contract renewals over new contract establishments, i.e. a
tenant obtains no advantage for its future requests from the
current contract. We also consider only nonelastic slices and
neglect resource multiplex over slices, i.e. no resource can
be allocated to multiple contracts simultaneously. Therefore,
when accepting the current request, the MNO also loses some
opportunity of accepting potential better deals in future.
The requests arrive stochastically. Usually, the arriving
rate remains on a certain level and the intervals between
different arrivals are independent from each other. Hence, it
is reasonable to consider the number of arriving requests in
a certain period as Poisson distributed. To simplify the model
we consider an enough short unit period so that the request
arrivals can be approximated as a Bernoulli process. We also
assume that the MNO possesses full a priori knowledge about
the statistics of arriving requests (resource bundle and contract
period), which we consider as consistent.
B. Model Setup
To normatively describe the simplified business model
above, we define the following sets, variables and mappings:
• Ψ = [0, 1]N : a general N-dimensional non-negative
Euclidean space to measure normalized network resource
bundles in reference to the maximal resource pool, where
N is the number of resource types.
• ψt ∈ Ψ: the normalized measure of idle resource pool
available at discrete time t ∈ N.
• Ωt ⊂ Ψ: the finite, discrete set of resource bundles
defined by all contract options provided by the MNO
with its idle resources at time t. Each element in Ωt is
a possible resource bundle requested at time t. The case
of no request arrival is considered as a null-request, i.e.
ωnull = 0
N ∈ Ωt, ∀t ∈ N. We also consider that the entire
resource pool is idle at t = 0 so that Ω0 is a predefined
set of resource bundles defined by the list of all available
contracts, and generally we have a generation function:
Ωt = G(ψt ) = {ω|ω ≤ ψt } ∩Ω0, ∀t ∈ N
1 (1)
• T ⊂ N+: the finite, discrete set of contract periods in all
contract options, inf(T) = 1 denotes a unit time period.
• P ⊂ R: the finite, discrete set of payments defined by all
contract options.
• Ω0
g
−→ [0, 1]: a probability measure on Ω0 representing the
probabilities of upcoming request for different contracts
in each unit time period.
• Ω0 × P(Ω0)
f
−→ [0, 1]: a probability measure represent-
ing the probabilities of upcoming request for different
contracts that can be supported by a given idle resource
pool2. We consider requests for oversize contracts beyond
the support of current idle resource pool as equivalent of
null contracts, hence generally:
f (ω,Ω) =

0 ω > sup(Ω)
g(ωnull) +
∑
µ>sup(Ω)
g(µ) ω = ωnull
g(ω) otherwise
(2)
• Ψ ×Ω0
F
−→ Ψ: the decision strategy that determines if to
accept the arrived requests. It maps from the current idel
resource pool and a received request to the idle resource
pool at the next period, i.e. F(ψt, ωt ) = ψt+1.
• Ω0 × T
p
−→ P: a pricing function that maps the resource
bundle and contract period (ω,T ) to the corresponding
periodical payment, the payment of a null contract is zero
i.e. p(ωnull,T ) = 0,∀T ∈ T.
• Ω0
q
−→ R: a function that maps a resource bundle to the
corresponding revenue it can generate within one unit
time period through its deployment in MNO’s own slices.
In this work we consider q as a linear function of ω.
III. PROFIT MODEL AND DECISION STRATEGY
Now we analyze the MNO’s profit of accepting a resource
request from tenant. In the following part of the paper, we use
the term (ψt, ωt,Tt ) to represent the request arriving at t.
A. Two-Step Decision, Non-Expiring Contract
We start with a simple two-step model, where both the MNO
and the tenant only act two unit periods, i.e. t ∈ {0, 1}. We also
assume that no contract will expire, which means Tt = 2 − t.
Now for the two periods we have two idle resource pools
ψ0, ψ1. As there is no contract expiry, no resource is released
at t = 1 so that
ψ1 =
{
ψ0 − ω0 (ψ0, ω0, 2) accepted;
ψ0 otherwise.
(3)
Obviously, as the MNO only operates two periods, it should
accept any contract request at t = 1 as long as its resource
1Note that here with ω ≤ ψt we denote ω is not greater than ψt in any
of the N dimensions.
2P(Ω0) denotes the power set of Ω0
3pool supports. So the focus is on the decision at t = 0. Given
any contract request (ψ0, ω0, 2) arrived at t = 0, the expected
payoff of accepting this request is
Γ1(ψ0, ω0) = (1 + β)p(ω0, 2) − C1(ψ0, ω0), (4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor to describe the time
value of money (TVM) [6], which is determined by the capital
market. C1 is the Opportunity Cost (OC) of this contract:
C1(ψ0, ω0) = (1 + β)q(ω0)
+ β
∑
ω∈Ω0
[ f (ω,Ω0) − f (ω,G(ψ0 − ω0)]p(ω, 1). (5)
Obviously, to maximize the profit, the MNO is supposed to
follow the optimal strategy of binary decision:
ψ1 = F1,opt(ψ0, ω0) =
{
ψ0 − ω0 Γ1(ψ0, ω0) ≥ 0;
ψ0 otherwise,
(6)
where case 1 denotes acceptance and case 2 for declination.
B. Multi-Step Decision, Non-Expiring Contract
Then we progress towards the multi-step model, where the
MNO and the tenant act tmax unit periods. Once again, as of
this step we still consider non-expiring contracts, so that the
request arriving at t has a contract period of Tt = tmax − t and
hence a periodical payment of p(ωt, tmax − t). Taking it into
account that time present value of any future payment x in
∆t periods from current under a discount factor β is xβ∆t , we
can compute the total present value of all payments for the
requested contract (ψt, ωt, tmax − t) as
ptmax (ωt ) =
tmax−1∑
τ=t
βτ−t p(ωt, tmax − t). (7)
Similarly, the present value of exploiting the resource bundle
ωt on the MNO’s own slice for tmax − t can be computed as
qtmax (ωt ) =
tmax−1∑
τ=t
βτ−tq(ωt ). (8)
Thus, the OC of any request arriving at t is
Ctmax (ψt, ωt ) = qtmax (ωt ) +
tmax−1∑
τ=t
βτ−t+1
×
∑
ω∈G(ψτ )
[ f (ω,Ωτ) − f (ω,G(ψτ − ωt ))]p(ω, tmax − t).
(9)
Therefore, let
Γtmax (ψt, ωt ) = ptmax (ωt ) − Ctmax (ψt, ωt ), (10)
the profit-maximizing decision by the MNO should be
ψt+1 = Ftmax ,opt(ψt, ωt ) =
{
ψt − ωt Γtmax (ψt, ωt ) ≥ 0;
ψt otherwise.
(11)
Note that as the OC is not promised to be convex about
the decision sequence [ψ0, . . . , ψtmax−1], (11) is not guaranteed
to achieve the global optimum of Ctmax (ψt, ωt ), but a local
maximum. Besides, according to (9), the OC Ctmax depends
on the expected idle resource pool in future ψτ>t , which is
Start with initial Ω0, ψ0, g(ω), a default strategy F
0
tmax
, a maximal
number of iterations imax and aconvergence threshold γ. ;
for i = 0 to imax do
Generate a request sequence according to g(ω);
Determine the decision sequence according to F i
tmax
;
Compute the OC C i
tmax
(ψ0, ω) under the new decision sequence
for all ω ∈ Ω0 according to (9);
Update the strategy F i
tmax ,opt
with the OC according to (11);
if i ≥ 1,
∑
ω∈Ω0
|C i+1
tmax
(ψ0, ω) −C
i
tmax
(ψ0, ω) | < γ then
return F i
tmax ,opt
;
else
Update the strategy: F i+1
tmax
← F i
tmax ,opt
;
end
end
return F
imax
tmax ,opt
;
Fig. 1: An iterative algorithm to approximate the target strat-
egy. In each iteration the strategy is tested and correspondingly
updated with a simulated request sequence, and the conver-
gence is evaluated by the estimated total OC of the simulated
request sequence under the updated strategy.
determined by the target decision strategy Ftmax ,opt, whose
solution (11) relies on Ctmax . This closed loop encourages to
apply an iterative approach, as briefly described in Fig. 1.
As Ctmax has non-negative terms and bounded partial sums,
it converges with increasing tmax. Therefore the sequence
(Citmax )i∈I is bounded where I = {1, 2, . . . , imax }. Thus, accord-
ing to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [7] it always has a
converging subsequence (C
j
tmax
)j∈J⊆I. By selecting a reasonable
imax we can renew I = J in order to construct a converging
sequence (Citmax), so that the iterative algorithm converges to a
limit as i approaches to imax .
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In real world, the MNO and tenants shall be considered
as long-term or even eternally operating, i.e. tmax → +∞.
According to (11), the sequence (ψ0, ψ1, . . . ) monotonically
decreases, and G(ψt ) converges to an empty set:
lim
t→+∞
G(ψt ) = ∅. (12)
Therefore we know that Ctmax (ψt, ωt ) is bounded as tmax →
+∞. Meanwhile, as p is bounded and β ∈ (0, 1), ptmax also
converges to a bounded value as tmax → +∞, so the proposed
approach also applies to the infinite-step case4.
Generally, in the case of non-expiring contract, at every
step of decision, the impacts of all historical decisions about
previous requests are completely reflected in the current idle
resource pool without any extra influence in the future. Hence,
the non-expiring contract model is a Markov model, and the
proposed decision strategy is also Markovian as well.
C. Multi-Step Decision, Expiring Contract
Subsequently we bring the issue of contract expiry into our
discussion. Consider flexible contract periods Tt < tmax − t
3Herewith we have analytically derived the convergence, but the converging
speed must be numerically evaluated, which shall be a follow-up work.
4Nevertheless, as the MNO is usually interested in a short-term or
intermediate-term (e.g. monthly or annual) profit, instead of the long-term
overall profit till forever, it is still practical to artificially set a finite t∗max .
4permitted, the resource bundle assigned to it will be released
to the MNO’s resource pool after the expiry. Thus, the idle
resource pool size ψt is not monotonically decreasing with t,
but jointly determined by all previous requests and decisions
during [0, t−1]. Hence, the model becomes non-Markovian and
the Markovian decision strategy (11) does not apply as it lacks
information about contract periods and previous decisions.
As a solution to this, given an arbitrary request (ψτ, ωτ,Tτ)
arriving at τ, we denote the indicator function
Iτ(t,Tτ) =
{
1 τ ≤ t ≤ τ + Tτ, (ψτ, ωτ,Tτ) accepted;
0 otherwise
(13)
to represent its validity at time t. Thus, we can represent the
resource bundle reserved for it at any time t as
ω
Tτ
t = ωt Iτ(t,Tτ) (14)
Then we define the scalar
ω˜t =
t−1∑
τ=0
ω
Tτ
t (15)
to track and aggregate the resource bundles currently re-
served by all previously accepted contracts. Thus, instead of
(ψt, ωt,Tt ), now we use (ω˜t, ωt,Tt ) to represent a contract
request. the equations (7) and (8) become
p
Tt
tmax
(ωt ) =
t+Tt−1∑
τ=t
βτ−tp(ωt,Tt ), (16)
q
Tt
tmax
(ωt ) =
t+Tt−1∑
τ=t
βτ−tq(ωt ), (17)
respectively, and thus the OC of accepting the request is
C
Tt
tmax
(ω˜t, ωt ) = q
Tt
tmax
(ωt ) +
tmax−1∑
τ=t
βτ−t+1
×
∑
ω∈G(ψτ )
[ f (ω,Ωτ) − f (ω,G(ψ0 + ω˜τ − ω
Tt
t ))]p(ω,Tt ).
(18)
Defining the payoff function
Γ
Tt
tmax
(ω˜t, ωt ) = p
Tt
tmax
(ωt ) − C
Tt
tmax
(ω˜t, ωt ), (19)
the non-Markovian profit-maximizing decision strategy is
F
Tt
tmax ,opt
(ψt, ωt ) =
{
ψ0 + ω˜t+1 − ωt Γ
Tt
tmax
(ψt, ωt ) ≥ 0;
ψ0 + ω˜t+1 otherwise.
(20)
In finite-step cases where tmax is finite, the number of
possible sequences ((ωt,Tt ))0≤t≤tmax is limited so that C
Tt
tmax
is bounded and the iterative approach in Fig. 1 still applies.
However, when tmax → +∞, as (ψt )t ∈N is not monotonic about
t, (12) fails to hold and no more convergence is guaranteed.
In this case, an artificial finite t∗max is needed, like we did in
the footnote 4.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
So far we have closed our study on the MNO’s decision
strategy under the assumptions in Sec. II-A. Nevertheless,
concerning the strength of our assumptions, some discussions
about their feasibilities may be necessary.
The first concern can be raised by the monopoly model with
only one MNO, because the tenants are may fail to obtain
resources to maintain services in this case. Practically, a pre-
ordering mechanism can be applied to allow early requests
before the due of slice creation. Thus, if a request is declined,
the tenant is still able to reattempt with another contract option
with better chance of acceptance. Moreover, it is true that in
practice there is usually not only one but several MNOs, i.e.
the market is actually oligarchy. While providing the tenant
more alternative options when its request is rejected by one
MNO, this fact does not necessarily conflict with our results
under the monopoly assumption, because oligarchy markets
differ from monopoly ones only in the supply, demand and
pricing mechanism, but not in the decision making logic [8],
which we focus on in this paper. Nevertheless, the competition
between MNOs in oligarchy markets worths further study.
Another doubt may arise about the exclusion of unexpected
contract termination and modification. Certainly they are ig-
nored here for model simplification, and can be eventually in-
volved in future work by introducing another random variable
with corresponding statistics. Similarly, in this work we have
ignored the preference in renewing old expiring contracts over
making new ones. For a better approximation to reality we can
consider all contracts as non-expiring, and apply the random
termination event instead to describe the tenant cancellation.
At last, the assumption that MNO possesses full a priori
knowledge about the request statistics may be argued. In
practice, although the a priori model is hard to obtain, it can
be estimated in a Bayesian approach from the a posteriori
historical records that every MNO keeps, as long as it re-
mains consistent. Even in case of non-stationarity, short-term
consistence can still be approximated with periodical updates.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, in an operations research perspective we have
investigated the 5G network resource management problem
of creating tenant slices upon request, aiming at a strategy
that maximizes the expected MNO revenue at every binary
decision. Different cases have been studied and an iterative
algorithm proposed. The convergence of proposed method
has been mathematically derived. For future works, numerical
experiments are expected to evaluate the converging speed and
the revenue gain of the proposed algorithm in both short and
long terms, elastic slices shall also be considered to enable
resource multiplexing between slices .
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